PRELIMINARIES AND BASIC CONCEPTS
A fetus: In ethical and philosophical context, any human offspring at any stage of its prenatal development, from conception to birth.
A narrower medical sense of the word ‘fetus': a fetus is the unborn entity from roughly the eight week of pregnancy (when brain waves can first be monitored) until birth. A fetus, in this sense, should be distinguished from a zygote (an entity from conception to implantation a week later) and an embryo (from implantation until the eight week).
Abortion: The deliberate causing of the death of a fetus, either by directly killing it or (more commonly) by causing its expulsion from the womb before it is "viable," that is before it is capable of surviving outside its mother's body.
THREE STAGES (OR STEPS) IN THE ABORTION DEBATE
STEP 1: What is the moral status of a human fetus?
- Is a human fetus a mere thing?
- Does a fetus have any experiences that, morally speaking, must be taken into consideration?
- Is a fetus the proper subject of moral considerations?
- Does a fetus have moral right?
THE MAIN ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION (AAA)
STEP I (an argument for a right to life, RL)
P1 From the moment of conception, a fetus is a person.
P2 Every person has a right to life (hereafter, RL).
C1 Therefore, from the moment of conception, a fetus has a RL. [from (P1) and (P2)]
STEP II (an argument about a possible conflict of "claims")
P3 Abortion kills a fetus.
P4 There are no considerations overriding a fetus' RL.
P5 Killing someone whose RL has not been overridden is morally wrong (it is murder).
C2 Therefore, abortion is morally wrong (it is murder). [from (C1) - (P5)]
STEP III (What is (or should be) the legal status of human fetus? Should fetus be granted any legal rights?)
P6 All morally wrong acts should be prohibited by law, unless there are extremely good reason for waving such prohibitions.
P7 There are no good reasons to wave such prohibitions in the case of abortion.
C3 Therefore, abortion should be prohibited by law. [from (C2), (P6), and (P7)]
THREE WAYS TO UNDERSTAND THE ABORTION DEBATE
"SIMPLE" INTERPRETATION Does a fetus have a RL Are there any other morally relevant considerations Does a woman have a right to chose RC PRO LIFE (1) yes no / (???) no PRO-CHOICE (1) no yes yes
This way of understandin the issue is popular in political debates. It ignores (STEP 2)m the possible conflict of claims and other moral considerations. In adition, it fails to distinguish ethical from legal issues (STEP 3).
"COMPLEX/SOPHISTICATED" INTERPRETATION Does a fetus have a RL Are there any other morally relevant considerations Do those e considerations override RL? Does a woman have a right to chose RC PRO LIFE (1) yes no xxx no PRO-LIFE (2) yes yes no (with few exceptions) no (with few exceptions) PRO-CHOICE (1) no yes xxx yes PRO-CHOICE (2) yes yes yes yes
"COMPLETE" INTERPRETATION Morally, does a woman have a RC (that overrides a RL)? Must law coincide with morality? Legally, does/should a woman have a RC? PRO LIFE (3) no yes no PRO-LIFE (4) no no yes (maybe) PRO-CHOICE (3) yes xxx yes
The English Oxford Dictionary, ‘person' may mean the following:
- Biological sense: ‘An individual human being; a man woman, or child.'
- general Philosophical Sense: ‘A self-conscious or rational being.'
- Legal Sense. ‘A human being (natural person) or body corporate or corporation (artificial person) having rights and duties recognized by law.'
Mary Anne Warren ("The abortion Issue", in Shaw, Social and Personal Ethics, 1996):
The concept of person has both a moral and an empirical dimension. A person, in... the moral sense of the term, is any entity to which [full, most basic, equal] moral rights... may be ascribed (128). The empirical aspect of the concept of a person is not essentially biological. [A person in this sense is any entity who] has certain sorts of mental and behavioral capacities (129).
EVALUATIVE (NORMATIVE) CONCEPTS OF PERSON
involve some strong normative (legal or moral or both) components
- Moral Personhood: X is a personM =def. X is a full member of moral community and as such has the most fundamental, equal moral rights.
- Legal Personhood: X is a personL =df X has some legal rights (possibly some legal obligations).
DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS OF PERSON (define persons from the biological, philosophical, commonsense, etc. points of view.)
- Biological Personhood: X is a personB =def. X is a human being (a being who has a specifically human genetical makeup (DNA); x is a member of a biological species--Homo Sapiens.
- Philosophical (Commonsense) Personhood: X is a personC =def. X is a rational and self-aware being.
CAPABILITIES OF PERSONS
1. Consciousness and sentience
2. Rationality, ability to solve general problems
3. Self-awareness or self-concept
4. Self-motivated behavior
5. Linguistic capacity
THE FIRST STEP IN THE DEBATE REVISITED
The first interpretation AAA (first step) Analogous argument P1a From the moment of conception, fetus is a personB. 1. Every river flows between two banks.
Neither argument is valid, the conclusions do not follow from the premises.
P2a Every personC has a RL.
C1 Therefore, a fetus has a RL. [from (P1a)&(P2a)]
2. Every bank is a financial institution.
C' Thus, every river flows between two financial institutions.
The second interpretation
P1b A fetus is a personC from the moment of conception.
P2b Every personC has a right to life.
C1 Thus, a fetus has a RL. [from (P1b)&(P2b)]
P2b is arguably true, but P1b is clearly false. Argument is unsound.
The third interpretation
P1c A fetus is a personM from the moment of conception.
P2c Every personM has a right to life.
C1 Therefore, a fetus has a RL. [from (P1c)&(P2c)]
P2c is true. But P1c is simply assumed, without any justification. But why should we assume that a fetus is a personM from the moment of conception? This assumption is exactly what is at stake (or what the argument/debate is all about). On what grounds should we assume that, from the moment of conception, a fetus has the same moral protection as all normal adult human beings? The argument begs the question. It assumes what it is supposed to show.
THE SPECIES CRITERION (SC) :X has a right to life (is entitled to full and equal protection by the moral rule against homicide) if and only if X is a member of the biological species Homo Sapiens.
Some Implications of SC (see Warren, 128):
- Human beings of all races, religions, and nationalities count as persons (moral).
- Rocks, trees, and non-human animals do not count as persons (do not have moral rights).
- "No non-human being could ever count as a person [protected by the moral principles] regardless of how sensitive, intelligent, kindly, or cooperative he, she, or it might. Language using dolphins or chimpanzees, sapient extraterrestrials, self-aware robots or androids, and even our own descendants, should they evolve into a biologically distinct species, are all ruled out."
THE POTENTIALITY CRITERION (PC): X has a right to life if and only if X is a commonsense person either actually or potentially.
THE POTENTIALITY PRINCIPLE (PP): If all Ys have some rights, then all potential Ys also have these rights.
Three potentiality arguments A moral status of fetus argument Analogous argument Another analogous argument P1a From the moment of conception, a fetus is potentially a personC. 1a After the election but before the inauguration Bill Clinton was potentially the President of U.S. 1b A newborn infant, Mary, is potentially (but not actually) an adult (i.e. 21 years old).
All three arguments are valid. But, Ca and Cb are clearly false. So, one of the premises of these arguments is false. (We cannot have a valid argument with all true premises and a false conclusion. So, ((PP) is false.
P2a All personsC have a right to life.
PP
C1 Therefore, a fetus has a RL. [from (P1a)&(P2a), and PP]
2a All Presidents of U.S. have presidential rights.
PP
Ca Therefore, after the election but before the inauguration Bill Clinton had presidential rights. [from (1a), (2a) & (PP)]
2b All adults have a right to drink.
PP
Cb Therefore, Mary has a right to drink. [from (1a), (2a) & (PP)]
THE ACTUAL POSSESSION CRITERION (APC): X has a right to life if and only if X is actually a commonsense person.
Some Implications:
- It is not the case that a fetus has a right to life.
- It is not the case that small infants have a right to life.
- It is not the case that severely retarded people have a right to life
THE "COMPELLING REASONS" CRITERION (CRC): X has a right to life if and only if (A) X is actually a commonsense person; or (B) there are some compelling reasons for extending a RL to X.
Some Implications:
- Normal adults have a right to life.
- To address Warren's worries: non-human beings are protected by the moral principles provided they sensitive, self-conscious and intelligent enough. This may include language using dolphins and chimpanzees, sapient extraterrestrials, self-aware robots or androids, and our own descendants (even if they evolve into a biologically distinct species).
- Small small infants severely retarded people have a right to life, if there are compelling reasons to extend a RL to them.
- The same is true about human fetuses
Reasons for extending the full moral protection to small children and retarded humans (see Warren) :
1. Most people feel affection for helpless newborn babies.
2. Maltreated infants may become antisocial children or adults.
3. There are more parents wishing to adopt infants (and give them decent care) than there are infants available for adoption.
4. Our society can afford to provide reasonable good care to all adoptable children.
5. Most people are willing to provide such care (even if it involves higher taxes and some sacrifices)
6. Respect for the wishes and personal feelings of those who have established personal relationships with retarded people.
7. Self-protection and the protection of others we care about.
8. Compassion for any sentient human being.
9. Slippery slope considerations -- a danger that we may abuse someone who is in fact a commonsense person.
Reasons against extending the full moral protection to small children: None whatsoever.
Are any of these reasons applicable to a human fetus?
1*. Some people feel affection for fetuses, especially at the late stages of pregnancy. (But this affection is less strong and not as prevalent as it is in the case of small babies or retarded people)
3. There are more parents wishing to adopt infants (and give them decent care) than there are infants available for adoption.
4. Our society can afford to provide reasonable good care to all adoptable children.
8. Compassion for any sentient human being.
Reasons against extending the full moral protection to fetuses
Extending full moral protection to fetuses would lead to serious and frequent conflicts of moral rights (fetuses rights might be in conflict with the rights of potential mother).
MARQUIS' VIEW: "...abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral... it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being" (p. 138). This is the case because "fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end" (p. 138).
A General Form of Marquis' Argument
1. It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill anyone (any being) who has certain morally relevant features, F.
2. A human fetus is F.
3. Therefore, it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill a human fetus; that is, prima facie abortion is seriously wrong.
Notice, M makes a case for prima facie wrongness of killing. This does allow for some exceptions. (141)
A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF THE WRONGNESS OF KILLING
- Why exactly is it wrong to kill a normal human being?
- What are the relevant features that make such killing seriously wrong?
TWO "OBVIOUSLY" MISTAKEN VIEWS (INDIRECT ACCOUNTS OF THE WRONGNESS OF KILLING)
1) Such killing brutalizes the one who kills.
2) Others will suffer a great loss due to our absence.
In general: "To think of the wrongness of killing somebody in terms of whether or not it will upset somebody else is to miss completely the somewhat obscure point. The Common Moral Consciousness is quite clear that the reason why it is wrong to kill somebody has something to do with him, not with his mother or maiden aunt" (R.E. Ewing, "What is Wrong with Killing People?", Phil. Quarterly, 22 (1972), p. 126).
MARQUIS ON WHY KILLING IS WRONG
Killing is wrong because it deprives one his or her valuable future.
That is, the relevant characteristic, F, that explain why it is wrong to kill someone is that this someone has a valuable future).
"The loss of one's life is one of the greatest loses one can suffer. The loss of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim" (p. 138).
VIRTUES OF MARQUIS' ACCOUNT (MA)
It accounts for many intuitions about killing.
Gives an account in "naturalistic", i.e., "scientifically accessible" terms.
E.g., compare MA with a divine command theory (=> killing is wrong because a deity does not want us to kill). We still need to know why (on what grounds) the deity issues this prohibition. For, surely, God is not a whimsical being who issues his command in completely arbitrary way. So, if God is not whimsical what are his reasons for issuing some prohibitions. (See, p. 139)
TWO IMMEDIATE REASONS SUPPORTING MARQUIS' ACCOUNT
A. MA explains why we regard killing as one of the greatest crimes. "It is especially wrong because it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime" (p. 139)
B. It explains why a premature death (e.g., a death which is a result of illness or accident) is especially bad (perhaps more bad that the death of a person who has a long and productive life).
ADDITIONAL REASONS SUPPORTING MA
1. Unlike various species criteria, MA explains well why it may be wrong to kill non-humans (e.g. ETs) who may have valuable future similar to ours.
2. Furthermore, it explains why it may be wrong to kill some animals (those who may have valuable future similar to ours) (See, p. 139; also see M on Kant, p. 141)
3. Unlike the sanctity of human life views, MA explains well why active euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible.
4. It explains why it is wrong to kill children and infants; namely, they have valuable future just like we do. (140)
MARQUIS' ACCOUNT IS ALLEGEDLY BETTER THAN ALTERNATIVES
Desire Account: People desire to live. Killing them frustrates this desire. So, it is wrong. (142)
Discontinuation Account: People value the experience of living and wish this experience to continue. Problem. What about someone who does not value this experience (e.g., is in pain). We then refer to future experiences. So, we adopt something like MA. (142-3)
IMPLICATIONS FOR ABORTION
- A fetus has a valuable future like ours.
- So, prima facie, it is seriously wrong to kill a fetus.
- So, prima facie, abortion is seriously wrong.
THIS IS NOT THE STANDARD POTENTIALITY ARGUMENT STANDARD POTENTIALITY ARGUMENT MARQUIS ARGUMENT 1. It is wrong to kill a normal personC. 1. It is wrong to kill any being who has a valuable future.
2. Fetus is potentially (but not actually) a normal personC
3. Potentiality principle: If it is wrong to kill As (e.g., normal persons), then it is wrong to kill potential As (e.g., a potential person).
____
C. So, it is wrong to kill a fetus
2. A fetus is a being who has a valuable future.
____
So, it is wrong to kill a fetus.
SOME PROBLEMS WITH MARQUIS' ACCOUNT
Contraception: The combination of sperm and ovum also seems to have valuable future. (144)
THOMSON ON THE SECOND STAGE OF THE ABORTION DEBATE: "Opponents of abortion commonly spend most of their time establishing that the fetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from there to the impermissibility of abortion... I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. How does the argument go from there?" (P. 147)
C1 From the moment of conception, a fetus has a RL.
4 No considerations override a fetus' RL. ["...a person's RL is stronger and more stringent that the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it" (147)]
5 Killing someone whose RL has not been overridden is morally wrong.
C2 Therefore, a fetus may not be killed, abortion is morally wrong.
Thomson clearly rejects (C1), see p. 156B.
She is credited with bringing the second part of the abortion debate to the forefront.
Her main point is that even if we suppose (contrary to fact) that ( C1) is true, it still does not follow that abortion is wrong. For we have good grounds for rejecting (4).
CASE 1: "THE VIOLINIST": You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. The Society for Music Lovers (SML) has kidnaped you and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital tells you, "Look, we're sorry the SML did this to you - we never would have allowed it had we known. Still, they have done it, to unplug him now would be to kill him. But never mind, its only for nine months. Is it morally incumbent upon you to accede to this situation? If you were to conclude that you did not have this obligation - to keep the violinist alive - then you must concede something is wrong with the above [argument about abortion].
A REPLY: One could be unplug from the violinist because one did not consent to being plugged up in the first place. Thus, if one were pregnant as a result of rape abortion would be permissible.
A PROBLEM: whether you have a RL or not is not dependent on whether or not you were a product of rape. (In addition, people like Noonan do not make exceptions for rape victims or even for health problems.)
CASE 2: "TINY HOUSE & RAPIDLY GROWING CHILD" (and the Extreme Anti-Abortion view implies that abortion is wrong even to save the mother's life.
You find yourself trapped in a very tiny house with a rapidly growing child. You are already up the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crashed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end he will simply burst open the house and walk out free. However innocent the child may be you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death. A woman surely can defend her life against the threat to it posed by the unborn child, even if doing so involves its death.
Distinguish moral innocence and causal innocence.
The rapidly growing child is morally innocent, but not causally innocent.
THE RIGHT TO LIFE & CASE 3: "HENRY FONDA'S COOL HAND": If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the same, I have no right to be given the touch... It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me. Similarly, "nobody has any right to use your kidneys unless you give him such a right" (150B).
The "Pro Life" advocates treat the RL as completely unproblematic. Some may think it includes the bare minimum a man needs for continued life. The above case shows that even this bare minimum may be, however, something he has no right at all to be given.
THE RIGHT TO USE THE MOTHER'S BODY :
In unplugging yourself, you are killing a violinist. The amendment may be made at this point (151):
The RL consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.
If a woman voluntarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in pregnancy, and then she becomes pregnant; is she not in part responsible for the very existence of the unborn person inside her? She did not invite it in. But doesn't her partial responsibility give a fetus a right to the use of her body?
CASE 4: BURGLARS AND PEOPLE SEEDS: If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say "Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars and that burglars burgle." (152A)
Suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not- despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. (152B)
The burglar case is analogous to the case of pregnancy due to carelessness (?), but see addition about bars and also the people-seeds case ( analogous to the case of pregnancy due to defective contraception).
To wit, not even somehow "chancy" voluntary actions that result in pregnancy give the unborn person a right to the use of its mother's body.
RIGHTS AND SACRIFICES: Suppose that the violinist needs only one hour. Suppose that letting him use your kidneys would not affect your health. [Even if you were kidnaped, even if you were raped] "it seems to me plain you ought to allow him to use your kidneys for that hour -- it would be indecent to refuse" (153A)
"Now some people are inclined to use the term ‘right' in such a way that it follows from the fact that you ought to allow a person to use your body for the hour he needs, that he has a right to use your body for the hour he needs, even thought he has not been given that right by anybody" (153A). But Thomson finds such symmetry unfortunate. She things that your behavior would not be unjust but might go against some other virtues (compassion, benevolence) and might display some vices (callousness , selfishness, greediness) (153B, 154A)
Kitty Genovese case (154B): We may be morally required to be "Minimally Decent" Samaritans.
It is not clear, there is a general moral obligation to be "(Very) Good" Samaritans. (155A)
PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS
Parents acquire their obligations as a result of their several STRONGLY VOLUNTARY and not chancy at all actions.
0 comments:
Post a Comment