Monday, March 16, 2009

The Professional-Client Relationship

The Professional-Client Relationship
Michael D. Bayles
From Professional Ethics (Belmont. CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.. 1981), pp. 60-70.

...Many analyses have been offered of the professional-client relationship. Some analyses are empirical; they describe the relationship as it normally exists. That is not the purpose of this section. Rather, the purpose here is to develop an ethical model that should govern the professional-client relationship. However, ethical models and norms often assume certain facts. For example, an ethical model of the appropriate relationship between parent and child makes certain assumptions about a child's abilities. A model of full equality would not work for very young children simply because they lack the physical and mental abilities to engage in such a relationship. Thus, although an ethical model of the professional-client relationship is not simply to describe it, a model can be inappropriate because it makes false empirical assumptions about one or the other parties.

The impulse of philosophy is to generalize. The present aim is to develop general statements of obligation that can require different conduct depending on the situation. The obligations to keep promises and make reparations for past injustice remain constant although the required conduct varies with the situation. There is no a priori reason why general obligations of professionals to clients cannot be established even though their application to particular cases requires different conduct in different situations. This does not imply ethical relativism.

To develop an ethical model that has the broadest scope, the model should not be based on unusual situations, such as a defendant charged with a capital crime or an unconscious patient. Unusual situations are so simply because they lack features of the usual or have additional features. An analysis based on unusual situations is therefore likely to distort normal situations. Professional ethics should be based on the usual sort of contact average clients have with professionals. Individual citizens are most likely to see lawyers in connection with real estate transactions, divorces, making wills, and personal injury negligence cases. Lawyers also spend much time drafting commercial contracts and advising about business matters. The average client will probably have a physician's attendance during a fatal illness or injury, but most physician-patient contacts are for more mundane matters such as a bacterial infection or a broken bone. Only gross neglect by the patient or physician-for example, the failure of a patient to take any medicine at all or of a physician to ask whether the patient is allergic to penicillin before prescribing it-is apt to turn these matters into seriously life-threatening illnesses or injuries. Engineers are apt to be consulted by companies or governments that want a project designed. Similarly, certified public ac- counts are most often hired to audit the books of a corporation. Both accountants and architects also deal with individuals for such purposes as income tax preparation and designing houses.

The central issue in the professional-client relationship is the allocation of responsibility and authority in decision making-who makes what decisions. The ethical models are in effect models of different distributions of authority and responsibility in decision making. One may view the professional-client relationship as one in which the client has most authority and responsibility in decision making, the professional being his employee; one in which the professional and client are equals, either dealing at arm's length or at a more personal level; or as one in which the professional, in different degrees, has the primary role. Each of these conceptions has been suggested by some authors as the appropriate ethical model of the relationship. Each has some commonsense support.

According to this view, the client has most of the authority and responsibility for decisions; the professional is an expert acting at the direction of the client.1 The client hires a professional to protect or act for some interest; the professional provides services to achieve the client's goal-purchase of a house, removal of a gallbladder, design of a building. According to this conception, not only does the professional act for or in behalf of the client, but also acts under the direction of the client as in bureaucratic employer-employee relation- ships. This conception is especially plausible for lawyers. In filing a complaint or arguing for a client, a lawyer acts for and in behalf of the client. According to some people, a lawyer is merely a "mouthpiece" or "hired gun." It is not a plausible view of accountants performing public audits, for they are supposed to provide an independent review and statement of the clients' financial conditions.

In some contexts, professionals are prone to adopt the agency view of the professional-client relationship. Professionals are sometimes "identified" with their clients and charged with the client's alleged moral failings. Lawyers offer the defense that in representing clients, they do not thereby ascribe to or support clients' goals or aims.2 They are merely employees hired to perform a specific task. If the projects are bad or immoral, the fault lies with the clients, or perhaps with the legal system for permitting them.

The agency model most clearly exemplifies what has been called the "ideology of advocacy." This ideology has two principles of conduct: (1) that the lawyer is neutral or detached from the client's purposes, and (2) that the lawyer is an aggressive partisan of the client working to advance the client's ends.3 This ideology is readily applicable to physicians, architects, and engineers. A physician, for example, should not evaluate the moral worth of patients but only work to advance their health. The second element of the ideology does not apply to accountants performing audits, for they are to present independent statements of clients' financial conditions. It applies in other accounting activities though. For example, an accountant preparing a client's income tax statement should try to take every plausible deduction on behalf of the client.

Some aspects of this ideology appear inescapable in professional ethics. If professionals accepted only clients whose purposes they approved of and did not consider clients' interests any more than those of others, many persons with unusual purposes (such as wanting an architectural style of a building that is completely inconsistent with those nearby) might be unable to obtain professional services. And even if they did, the services might not be worth much, as no special consideration would be paid to their interests.4 The chief problem with the ideology of advocacy, where it does be- come an ideology, is that sometimes devotion to a client's interests is thought to justify any lawful action advancing the client's ends, no matter how detrimental the effect on others.

The agency view of the professional-client relationship is unduly narrow. A number of considerations indicate limits to a professional's proper devotion to a client's interests, and consequently to a client's authority in decision making.

1. ...Professionals have obligations to third persons that limit the extent to which they may act in behalf of client interests.

2. The agency view arises most often in the context of defending professionals, especially lawyers, from attribution of client sins. This focus is too narrow to sustain a general account of the professional-client relationship. It best pertains to an adversarial context in which two opposing parties confront one another. In counseling, a lawyer's advice "need not be confined to purely legal considerations. ...It is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally pennissible."5

3. Professionals emphasize their independence of judgment. Unlike a soldier who is not expected to think for himself but to do things the army's way, professionals should exercise their training and skills to make objective judgments. The agency view ignores this feature.

4. Except in cases of dire need-medical emergencies, persons charged with crimes-professionals may accept or reject specific clients. With a few restrictions, they may also stop the relationship. Consequently, the agency view is too strong. Professionals must also be ethically free and responsible persons. For their own freedom and the protection of others, they should not abdicate authority and responsibility in decision making.

The strongest possible claim of supremacy has been suggested, namely, that, like the common law doctrine of the merging of the identity of the husband and wife, the attorney and client are similarly merged in the identity of the client.6 The proposal was made in the context of attempts by professional has the special knowledge produced by long training, knowledge a client could not have without comparable training. Second, a client is concerned about some basic value-personal health, legal status, or financial status-whereas a professional is not as concerned about the subject matter of their relationship. The client usually has more at stake. Third, a professional often has a freedom to enter the relationship that a client lacks. A professional is often able to obtain other clients more easily than a client can obtain another professional. Especially if a potential client has an acute illness or has just been charged with a crime, he or she is not free to shop around for another professional. From this point of view, the bargaining situation is more like that between an individual and a public utility.

These considerations are not as important for the usual situation in architecture, accounting, and engineering. The clients of these professionals are often better informed about the subject matter of the transaction than are clients of lawyers and physicians. For example, businesses and corporations have accountants working for them who can give advice about auditors. Often firms hiring consulting engineers have had previous experience working with engineers in that field. Governments, even local ones, frequently have one or two engineers working for them who can advise and help. Moreover, they are freer than the professional to conclude an arrangement with another firm. Thus, in these situations the factual basis for the contract model is most nearly present. However, the consulting engineer or architect has some special knowledge and ability the client lacks, or else a professional would probably not be hired, so the contract model's empirical assumptions do not quite hold even in these cases.

Instead of viewing the relationship as one between two free and equal persons dealing at arm's length, some authors suggest that the relationship is more personal. One does not relate to a professional as one does to a grocer or public utility. The personal element is most closely captured by viewing the relationship as one of pals or friends. According to this view, professional and client have a close relationship of mutual trust and cooperation; they are involved in a mutual venture, a partnership.

Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this conception is that proposed by Charles Fried.10 He is primarily concerned with the legal and medical professions. Fried seeks to justify professionals devoting special attention and care to clients and sometimes seeking ends and using means that they would not seek or use for themselves. Friends are permitted, even expected, to take each others' interests seriously and to give them more weight than they do those of other persons. Fried suggests that the attorney-client relationship is analogous to a one-way limited friendship in which the lawyer helps the client secure legal rights. The lawyer helps the client assert his autonomy or freedom within the bounds society permits. Others have suggested that the physician-patient relationship should similarly be viewed as a cooperative effort of friends or pals to deal with the patient's illness or injury.

The many dissimilarities between friendship and the professional-client relationship, however, destroy the analogy. First, as Fried recognizes, the professional-client relationship is chiefly in one direction; the professional has a concern for the client's interests but not vice versa. Second, friendship is usually between equals. Even in friendships between employer and employee, the employer's superiority in the office is changed to a position of equality in the bar for a drink. As the above discussion of the contract model indicates, professionals and clients are not equals. Third, the affective commitment of friendship is usually lacking .11 Professionals accept clients for a fee, not out of concern for individuals. Thus, one commentator concludes that "Fried has described the classical notion, not of friendship, but of prostitution."12 As the factual assumptions of this model are in- correct and the analogy supporting it is weak, its ethical implications are unfounded.

The friendship analogy is not needed to justify a professional paying special attention to a client's interests. The role of a professional is to provide services to clients, and the acceptance of a client is sufficient to justify the special attention. A barber who accepts a customer pays special attention to a customer's hair over that of others who need a haircut more. One need not postulate the barber as friend to justify this attention. It is presupposed by any system of services for a fee. would not seek or use for themselves. Friends are permitted, even expected, to take each others' interests seriously and to give them more weight than they do those of other persons. Fried suggests that the attorney-client relationship is analogous to a one-way limited friendship in which the lawyer helps the client secure legal rights. The lawyer helps the client assert his autonomy or freedom within the bounds society permits. Others have suggested that the physician-patient relationship should similarly be viewed as a cooperative effort of friends or pals to deal with the patient's illness or injury.

Once one abandons models that assume the professional and client are equal and accepts that the professional is to some extent in a superior position to the client, one faces the problem of the proper extent of professional authority and responsibility in decision making. Parents have knowledge and experience that children lack, and it is often ethically appropriate for them to exercise their judgment on behalf of their children. Similarly, as a professional has knowledge and experience a client lacks and is hired to further the client's interests, perhaps the relationship should be viewed as one of paternalism.

Paternalism is a difficult concept to analyze. A person's conduct is paternalistic to the extent his or her reasons are to do something to or in behalf of another person for that person's well-being. What is done can be any of a number of things, from removing an appendix to preventing the person from taking drugs. One can also have a paternalistic reason for acting in behalf of a person-for ex- ample, filing a counterclaim or asserting a legal defense. The key element of paternalism derives from the agent, X, acting regardless of the person's, Y's, completely voluntary and informed consent. X's reason is that he or she judges the action to be for Y's well-being regardless of Y's consent to it. y may be incapable of consent, as when a physician treats an unconscious patient in an emergency, or y may never have been asked, or may have refused to consent to the act.

Conduct can be paternalistic even when y in fact consents.13 For example, if X is prepared to do something to y regardless of Y's consent, then X's reason is paternalistic even if y does consent. , Parents frequently manipulate a child into assenting I' to actions, although they were prepared to do them without the child's assent. The key element is that X would have done the action, if he could, even if y had not consented. Such claims are difficult to establish, but this difficulty is a practical problem and does not affect the conceptual matter. In manufacturing consent, information can be withheld, false information provided, or more emphasis placed on some facts than others. Professionals sometimes manufacture consent when action cannot legally be taken without client consent, such as accepting a settlement or performing an operation. The concept of doing something to or in behalf of someone includes failure to do something. Suppose y requests X to do something for him, but X refuses because she thinks it would be detrimental to Y's well-being; for example, a physician refuses to prescribe a tranquilizer for a patient. This also counts as doing something to or in behalf of a person without his consent; y does not consent to the tranquilizers being withheld.

A voluminous literature exists concerning the justification of paternalism. The brief discussion here will outline only the major arguments. Paternalism requires justification because it involves doing something to or in behalf of another person regardless of that person's consent. It thus denies people the freedom to make choices affecting their lives. They lack the freedom of self-determination. ...The loss of control over their own lives, especially to professionals, is one reason for people's concern about professional ethics. Thus, paternalism is of central importance in professional ethics.

Three arguments are often offered to justify paternalism.

1. The agent has superior knowledge as to what is in a person's best interest. Because the agent knows better than the person what is best, the agent is justified in acting to avoid significant harm to, or to procure a significant benefit for, the person. This argument is perhaps the central one in favor of paternalism by professionals. As noted before, a professional possesses a relevant knowledge the client lacks, so he or she is better able to perceive the advantages and disadvantages of alternative actions. Consequently, the professional rather than the client should have primary authority and responsibility for decisions.

2. The client is incapable of giving a fully free and informed consent. By "fully free" is meant without duress, psychological compulsion, or other emotional or psychological disturbance. By "informed" is meant with appreciation of the consequences of a course of conduct and its alternatives. If people cannot give such consent, then their decisions will not adequately reflect their reasonable desires and will not be expressions of their "true selves." This argument, which in some respects is a subcase of the previous one, is also popular in the professions, especially medicine. It is often claimed that people who are ill have a strong feeling of dependency, are worried by their illness, and are in a weakened state, and so lack their usual mental command. A somewhat similar argument can be made about lawyers' clients. If charged with a criminal offense, a person is fearful and disturbed. Even in civil suits, a client's emotions might be aroused, preventing an objective view of the situation.

3. A person will later come to agree that the decision was correct. Although the person does not now consent, he will later .For example, an unconscious accident victim with a broken limb will agree that a physician was correct to set the bone. Parents often require their children to do things, such as take music lessons, on the ground that later the children will be glad they did-"You'll thank me later!" An engineer might see a way to improve an agreed-upon rough design to better serve a client's needs, although it involves a significant alteration from the rough design. She might make the change in the belief that the client will agree when he sees the completed design.

To decide whether these justifications support viewing the professional-client relationship as paternalistic, it is useful to consider when reasonable people would allow others to make decisions for them. First, a person might not wish to bother making decisions because the differences involved are trivial. For example, an executive authorizes a secretary to order any needed office supplies, be- cause the differences between brands of paper clips and so forth are not important. Second, the decisions might require knowledge or expertise a per- son does not possess. For example, an automobile mechanic knows whether a car's oil filter needs changing. One goes to a mechanic for knowledge and service. Third, a person might allow others to make judgments if he or she is or will be mentally incompetent. Some people voluntarily enter mental hospitals. The first of these reasons does not directly relate to the arguments for paternalism, but the second and third do relate to the first two arguments for paternalism. Reasonable persons would allow others to make decisions for them when they lack the capacity to make reasonable judgments. However, most clients do not have sufficiently impaired judgment to reasonably allow others to make important decisions for them. This incapacity argument has little or no plausibility for the common clients of architects, engineers, and accountants. Business and corporate clients of lawyers are unlikely to have significantly impaired judgment, even if they are biased. Moreover, even with individuals, the view is not plausible for the common legal and medical cases. A person who wants to purchase a house or make a will, or who has the flu or an infection, is rarely so distraught as to be unable to make reasonable decisions. Consequently, the argument from incapacity does not support adopting a paternalistic conception of the professional-client relationship for most cases, although it supports using that conception in special cases. The first argument for paternalism, that from superior knowledge, fits with reasonable persons allowing others to make decisions when they lack knowledge. Moreover, clients go to professionals for their superior knowledge and skills; such knowledge and skill is a defining feature of a profession. However , many decisions require balancing legal or health concerns against other client interests. As many authors have noted, crucial professional decisions involve value choices.14 They are not simple choices of technical means to ends, and even choices of means have a value component. Professionals have not had training in value choices. Even if they had, they might not know a client's value scheme sufficiently to determine what is best for him when everything is considered. An attorney might advise a client that he or she need not agree to such large alimony or child support payments, but the client might decide that for personal relations with the former spouse or the welfare of the children, the larger payments are best. Similarly, a physician can advise bed rest, but because of business interests a client can decide her overall interests are best promoted by continuing to work on certain matters. The client might especially need the income or be on the verge of completing a business deal that will earn a promotion. Physicians sometimes fail to realize that a patient's other concerns, even a vacation trip with the family, can precede health. They write and speak of the problem of patient noncompliance just as parents speak of noncompliance by children. Yet, one does not have everything when one has health. Similarly, a client might want an engineering or architectural design to use one type of construction rather than another because its subsidiary supplies such materials. Although a professional and client are not equals, sufficient client competence exists to undermine the paternalistic model as appropriate for their usual relationship. Clients can exercise judgment over many aspects of professional services. If they lack information to make decisions, professionals can provide it. Sometimes professionals argue that clients can never have the information they have. This is true, but not directly to the point. Much of the information professionals have is irrelevant to decisions that significantly affect client values. The precise name of a disease and its manner of action are not relevant to deciding between two alternative drug therapies, but the fact that one drug reduces alertness is. Similarly, clients of engineers do not need to know the full weight a structure will bear, only that it is more than sufficient for all anticipated stress. To deny clients authority and responsibility by adopting the paternalistic model is to deny them the freedom to direct their own lives. Clients are not capable of determining the precise nature of their problem, or of knowing the alternative courses of action and predicting their consequences or carrying them out on their own. They need and want the technical expertise of a professional to do so. However, they are capable of making reasonable choices among options on the basis of their total values. They need professionals' information in order to make wise choices to accomplish their purposes. Finally, when the professional-client relation- ship is conducted on the paternalistic model, client outcomes are not as good as when the client has a more active role. Douglas E. Rosenthal studied settlement awards in personal injury cases.15 The actual awards received were compared to an expert panel's judgments of the worth of the claims. The less the client participated in the case by not ex- pressing wants or seeking information from the lawyers, and so on, the more the awards fell short of the panel's estimates of the worth of claims. Not only does the paternalistic model sacrifice client freedom and autonomy, but as a result client values and interests are also often sacrificed.

As a general characterization of what the professional-client relationship should be, one needs a concept in which the professional's superior knowledge is recognized, but the client retains a significant authority and responsibility in decision making. The law uses such a conception to characterize most professional-client relationships, namely, that of a fiduciary .In a fiduciary relationship, both parties are responsible and their judgments given consideration. Because one party is in a more advantageous position, he or she has special obligations to the other. The weaker party depends upon the stronger in ways in which the other does not and so must trust the stronger party.

In the fiduciary model, a client has more authority and responsibility in decision making than in the paternalistic model. A client's consent and judgment are required and he participates in the decision-making process, but the client depends on the professional for much of the information upon which he gives or withholds his consent. The term consents (the client consents) rather than decides (the client decides) indicates that it is the professional's role to propose courses of action. It is not the conception of two people contributing equally to the formulation of plans, whether or not dealing at arm's length. Rather, the professional supplies the ideas and information and the client agrees or not. For the process to work, the client must trust the professional to accurately analyze the problem, canvass the feasible alternatives, know as well as one can their likely consequences, fully convey this information to the client, perhaps make a recommendation, and work honestly and loyally for the client to effectuate the chosen alternatives. In short, the client must rely on the professional to use his or her knowledge and ability in the client's interests. Because the client cannot check most of the work of the professional or the information supplied, the professional has special obligations to the client to ensure that the trust and reliance are justified.

This is not to suggest that the professional simply presents an overall recommendation for a client's acceptance or rejection. Rather, a client's interests can be affected by various aspects of a professional's work, so the client should be consulted at various times. The extent of appropriate client participation and decision making can be determined by advertence to the reasons for allowing others to make decisions for one. Professionals do not have expertise in a client's values or in making value choices. Their superior knowledge and expertise do not qualify them to make value choices significantly affecting a client's life plans or style. However, they do have knowledge of technical matters. A patient will certainly let a physician determine the dosage of medicines. A client can reasonably allow an engineer to determine the general specifications of materials for a job. A lawyer may decide whether to stipulate facts, object to testimony, or agree to a postponement.16 Clients allow professionals to make these judgments, be- cause the effects on their values are small and they do not wish to be bothered. In short, client consent and involvement are not necessary when (1) the matter is chiefly a technical one or (2) the value effect is not significant.

The appropriate ethical conception of the professional-client relationship is one that allows clients as much freedom to determine how their life is affected as is reasonably warranted on the basis of their ability to make decisions. In most dealings of business and corporate clients with accountants, architects, engineers, and lawyers, the relationship is close to a contract between equals. As clients have less knowledge about the subject matter for which the professional is engaged, the special obligations of the professional in the fiduciary model become more significant. The professional must assume more responsibility for formulating plans, presenting their advantages and disadvantages, and making recommendations. Because of the increased reliance on the professional, he or she must take special care to be worthy of client trust. Thus, although the fiduciary model is appropriate throughout the range of competent clients and services, the less a client's knowledge and capacity to understand, the greater the profession- al's responsibilities to the client.

Finally, some clients are not competent to make decisions. In this case, the paternalistic model becomes appropriate. These cases of an incompetent client will almost always be restricted to members of the legal and health professions. Even then it does not follow that the professional should make the decisions. If a client is incompetent, a legal guardian should be appointed to make decisions. When this is done, the professional has a fiduciary relationship to the guardian. Consequently, the appropriate occasions for professionals to adopt a paternalistic role are restricted to those in which a client is incompetent and a guardian has not yet been appointed. ...

1. See Robert M. Veatch, "Models for Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age." Hastings Center Report 2:3 (June 1972): 5-7, p. 5. Veatch calls this the engineering model of the physician, but this assumes it is appropriate for engineers.

2. See American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Proposed Final Draft (Chicago: American Bar Association, 30 May 1981), 1.2(b).

3. See William A. Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice in Professional Ethics", 1978 Wisconsin Law Review: 29-144, p. 36.

4. Simon's [op. cit.] proposed alternative to the ideology of advocacy suffers these defects to some extent. He does not allow for professional roles. Thus, all professional obligations are at best specifications of ordinary norms. "The foundation principle of non-professional advocacy is that problems of advocacy be treated as a matter of personal ethics. ...Personal ethics apply to people merely by virtue of the fact that they are human individuals. The obligations involved may depend on particular circumstances or personalities, but they do not follow from social role or station." Ibid., p. 131.

5. ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct (Chicago: ABA, 1979), EC [Ethical Consideration] 7-8; see also ABA Commission, Proposed Model Rules, op. cit., 2.1 and comment.

6. Roger M. Grace, "Invading the Privacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship." Case and Comment 81 (July-August 1976): 46-49, p. 47.

7. ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR [Disciplinary Rule] 4-101(C)(3); ABA Commission, Pro- posed Model Rules 1.6(b).

8. Veatch, op. cit., p. 7. 9. See, for example, Roger D. Masters, "Is Contract an Adequate Basis for Medical Ethics?" Hastings Center Report 5:6 (December 1975): 24-28, p. 5; William F. May, "Code, Covenant, Contract, or Philanthropy?" Hastings Center Report 5:6 (December 1975): 29-38, p. 35 H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. "Rights and Responsibilities of Patients and Physicians," in Medical Treatment of the Dying: Moral Issues, ed. Michael D. Bayles and Dallas M. High (Cam- bridge, MA: G. K. Hall and Schenkman, 1978), pp. 16- 17; Richard Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues," in 1977 Conference on Teaching Moral Responsibility: Pre-Conference Materials, ed. Stuart C. Goldberg (Detroit: University of Detroit Law School, 1977), pp. 122-22.

10. Charles Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation," in Gold- berg, op. cit., pp. 129-58; and Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) chap. 7; see also Veatch, op. cit., p. 7.

11. Edward A. Dauer and Arthur Allen Leff, "The Lawyer as Friend," in Goldberg, op. cit., p. 164.

12. Simon, op. cit., p. 108.

13. Cf. Joseph S. Ellin, "Comments on 'Paternalism in Health Care,' " in Contemporary Issues in Biomedical Ethics. ed. John w. Davis, Barry Hoffmaster, and Sarah Shorten (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1978), pp. 245-46.

14. See, for example, Glenn C. Graber, "On Paternalism and Health Care," in Davis et al., eds., op. cit., p. 239; Allen E. Buchanan, "Medical Paternalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 7:4 (1978): 370-90, p. 381; and Alan H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Little- field, 1980), pp. 179-86.

15. Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1974), chap.2.

16. See ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, op. cit., EC7-7; but see ABA Commission, Proposed Model Rules, op. cit., 1.2(a), 1.4.